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Commentary
Medical research, Big Data and
the need for privacy by design
Bart Jacobs and Jean Popma
Abstract
Medical research data is sensitive personal data that needs to be protected from unauthorized access and unintentional
disclosure. In a research setting, sharing of (big) data within the scientific community is necessary in order to make
progress and maximize scientific benefits derived from valuable and costly data. At the same time, convincingly protecting
the privacy of people (patients) participating in medical research is a prerequisite for maintaining trust and willingness to
share. In this commentary, we will address this issue and the pitfalls involved in the context of the PEP project1 that
provides the infrastructure for the Personalized Parkinson’s Project,2 a large cohort study on Parkinson’s disease from
Radboud University Medical Center (Radboudumc), in cooperation with Verily life Sciences, an Alphabet subsidiary.
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Introduction
In this commentary we will share our experiences in the
design process for secure and privacy-friendly data
management in a large scale medical cohort study
regarding Parkinson’s disease. This study is carried
out by Radboud University Medical Center, in cooper-
ation with Verily Life Sciences Inc., a subsidiary of
Alphabet. The public–private cooperation between an
Academic Hospital and a large corporate stakeholder
must involve explicit attention to aspects of privacy and
data protection, to address concerns raised by partici-
pation of a commercial stakeholder with its own private
interests.
As researchers involved in technological and legal
protection of data and privacy in a broad sense we
have become involved in this project. Our direct con-
tribution was the design and implementation of a novel
data management infrastructure with a strong emphasis
on security and privacy. Participating in this project,
together with medical researchers, has enabled us to
gain an in-depth view into medical research practices
and into the requirements that need to be fulﬁlled in
order to perform such a study in a responsible way,
and to contribute to the implementation of these
requirements. Sharing lessons learned, especially from
a computer science perspective, may provide good prac-
tices for future studies of this kind. In this commentary
we extrapolate from this Parkinson’s study to other
medical studies.
Sharing of data within a research context is a pre-
requisite for gaining new scientiﬁc insights. At the same
time this raises questions on aspects like data quality
(standardization, comparability, methodology), privacy
of the subjects participating in a study and rights of
these participants regarding their data. Who will have
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access to this data? Who will have access to study
results and beneﬁts? There is always the risk that exist-
ing data is used for other purposes than it was origin-
ally collected for, like in the Google-NHS case, where
health data from hospitals was shared with Google to
develop new AI technology (Hodson, 2016). This may
lead to unlawful and/or ethically questionable process-
ing of this data. It may be tempting to reuse data col-
lected in one speciﬁc context (for instance, academic
scientiﬁc research) in another, diﬀerent context (for
instance, commercial product development or proﬁling
of individuals) (Nissenbaum, 2011). This will almost
certainly result in frictions regarding personal interests
of data subjects (security, privacy) on the one hand,
versus interests of researchers, corporate actors (intel-
lectual property) and the public interest (societal
beneﬁts of scientiﬁc progress) on the other.
Most of these frictions can be avoided if the data can
be kept in their original context – applying principles of
privacy by design (Hoepman, 2014) – in an early stage
of deﬁning research plans when all processes needed for
adequate protection of personal rights are designed and
implemented.
Our primary role in this project is to provide novel
(cryptographic) methods for the protection of the con-
ﬁdentiality of data, thereby protecting the privacy of
participants in this study. These methods focus on
pseudonymisation and encryption, in so-called poly-
morphic form. The technical details have been
described elsewhere and are not of direct concern here
(Verheul et al., 2016).
In the ﬁrst two years in our support-role to the
Parkinson’s study, it became clear that in order to
eﬀectively protect data and privacy of study partici-
pants, four basic processes need to be organized and
implemented: informed consent, data governance, data
use agreements and data security. These four processes
were among several areas of interest that had been
identiﬁed at the start of the project, based on experi-
ences from previous studies. We single out these four
processes here since during the project itself it became
obvious that there were major pitfalls involved. It is
about these four processes that we gained valuable
experience that we share in this commentary. In the
following, we will discuss these pitfalls more elaborately
and we will try to formulate guidelines for responsible
processing of shared scientiﬁc data.
Distinguishing informed consent from
other matters
For the purpose of scientiﬁc medical research the only
legal basis for processing and sharing of data is
informed consent, at least in European countries.3
A participant in a study must give this consent after
he or she is well informed about the consequences
(risks) of participating, the purpose of the study, the
way data will be used and secured and the way he/she
can exercise his/her basic rights to inspection, correc-
tion and erasure of data. Consent must be obtained in
such a way that subjects can distinguish the consent
information from other matters using clear and plain
language. People suﬀering from a speciﬁc disease are
often highly motivated to participate in a medical
research project. Not as much for their own personal
beneﬁt but more altruistically, as a personal contribu-
tion to the improvement of future treatment (Nobile
et al., 2013). In writing consent documentation
(including consent forms) for participants there are
two issues that cause a potential conﬂict with the
basic principle of informed consent.
The ﬁrst problem (the ‘‘glossy’’ syndrome) is that a
researcher recruiting participants for a study usually
has an interest to ﬁnd as many suitable participants
as possible. Recruiting a cohort of scientiﬁcally relevant
size is not trivial. A researcher might be tempted to
document the consent information with this in mind,
in order to motivate people to participate. Participants
might even be stimulated to discuss their participation
on social media, in order to promote the project and
make recruitment of suitable participants easier. This is
not in line with the idea behind informed consent,
where a clear and comprehensible description of all
the risks for the participant in a study should be docu-
mented, clearly distinguishable from other matters and
interests. An example of this is the sharing of data with
researchers in countries that have a lower level of pro-
tection of personal data in their national legislation.
This introduces risks of unintended use of the data –
for instance for surveillance or proﬁling purposes.
Being clear about all the personal risks involved
might discourage potential participants to participate,
while not presenting this information would disable
a free and informed decision.
The second problem with informed consent
(the ‘‘legal’’ syndrome) is that even if the information
presented to a potential participant is correct and com-
plete, the documentation becomes very comprehensive,
in almost legal wordings in order to avoid any future
liabilities. Many examples of informed consent docu-
mentation presented to potential study participants
suﬀer from either the glossy or the legal syndrome,
often from both at the same time.
Within the aforementioned Parkinson’s study we
have contributed by reviewing the consent documenta-
tion shared with potential participants. As a result the
glossy and legal components were stripped from the
basic consent information, focusing on the participants
and their privacy risks. Legal and promotional aspects
can and should still be described in other informational
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documents, as they can provide relevant information
for participants.
Data governance should not end
with sharing
Data governance is a process encompassing the organ-
ization of tasks, responsibilities and control over data.
Here we shall focus on access control for personal
(medical) data in a research context using the frame-
work provided by the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR). Data governance is not a simple
task nor is it a one-time eﬀort. The most important
responsibility is to keep data within its original context
(tightly coupled to the informed consent) at all times,
during the entire life span of the data. Through data
governance, it must also be ensured that data is handled
in a secure way, by providing the means to manage and
store this data securely until it is shared. Certainly if
data is voluminous this can be an expensive obligation.
Often the cost of security and management of data over
a prolonged period (it is a good practice to keep data
available for up to 25 years after termination of a
research project) is underestimated. Potentially, either
storage quality and/or data protection are compro-
mised, with all the risks involved. It is clear that data
governance is a crucial responsibility, requiring com-
municational, organizational, legal and technical skills
and long-term ﬁnancial means, which in combination
tend to be scarce resources.
Collecting and storing of data is typically followed
by sharing the data with researchers. This means that
there must be a system in place to ensure that all organ-
izational, legal and technical prerequisites are met. This
involves taking informed and transparent decisions on
requests for data access by other researchers (Is the
intended research and use of the data in line with the
consent given?). The GDPR recognizes the roles of con-
troller (the responsible person/organization providing
the means and determining the goals of data process-
ing) and data processor (processing the data on behalf
of the controller). Their relationship is documented in a
processor agreement. This is the general GDPR con-
text. While some use of research data might ﬁt in the
controller/processor model used in the GDPR, in most
cases sharing of research data involves transfer of con-
trollership over this data. The diﬃculty is that the
consent was given to the original controller, whilst the
new controller who uses shared data has no relation-
ship with the data subject (study participant) nor any
knowledge of his/her true identity. This means that far-
reaching contractual arrangements must be made by
the original controller to be able to exercise his/her
obligations to the study participant bound by the par-
ticipant’s consent that would hold even when he/she
transfers formal controllership over the data. This
problem is often overlooked or not addressed properly.
In fact an agreement is needed that bears a great resem-
blance to a processor agreement, but lacks the legal
(GDPR-deﬁned) status of such an agreement.
Drafting and implementing such an agreement is a tedi-
ous task, requiring many resources. Taking care of the
data, its use, and communication about the use does
not end with the sharing of the data and the transfer of
controllership. It is a persisting responsibility for the
original controller.
In the case of the Personalized Parkinson’s Project,
data governance is formally part of the responsibilities
of the Principal Investigator at Radboud University
Medical Center, enabled by the informed consent
obtained from the study participants. The operational
aspects are partly exercised through a Research and
Data Sharing Review Board, in which all major stake-
holders are represented. Any use of the data must be
approved by this board. It is a pitfall that data govern-
ance receives a great deal of attention when the project
is started, but it should remain eﬀective for the entire
life cycle of the research data, a period often exceeding
the presence of the Principal Investigator him/herself.
It must therefore be anchored at the organization level.
We observe that few organizations have instruments to
accommodate for this.
Data use agreements: The legal basis
for data sharing
As stated in the previous paragraph the original
controller can only exercise his/her responsibilities,
obligations and rights regarding data shared with
other researchers through a legally binding data use
agreement. Drafting such an agreement is a compli-
cated and expensive legal exercise. First, such a
data use agreement must ensure that the use of the
data is within the bounds of the original purpose
(and the informed consent), and that all obligations
of the original controller regarding the data and the
data subject can be met after formal controllership
has been transferred to the data user. Examples of
this include obligations such as reporting of accidental
ﬁndings that are severe and relevant to the data
subject (such as for instance evidence for the presence
of carcinoma), a strict policy prohibiting de-
pseudonymisation or reporting of data breaches that
might lead to exposure of privacy-sensitive informa-
tion. Second, a data use agreement should also enforce
the requirements for data protection, conﬁdentiality
and pseudonymisation, as deﬁned in relevant
ISO-standards.4
The third area that needs to be covered is intellectual
property. A minimum requirement in the
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aforementioned Parkinson’s project is that all derived
data (derived from other data or from bio-samples)
should be contributed to the study repository and the
original controller – through his/her governance
responsibilities – must be allowed to share this data
with other researchers. Examples of derived or
enhanced data are for instance new analyses performed
on shared bio-samples, or improved representations of
raw fMRI-data. Whether the same holds for intellectual
property (IP) and scientiﬁc ﬁndings is up for debate. In
general the data use agreement must be very clear on
the rules that apply to IP. In a scientiﬁc context
researchers will have an interest to publish their results
ﬁrst before sharing them or the data they have used to
produce them. In a commercial research context com-
panies may want to protect their ﬁndings prior to shar-
ing them, to be able to commercialize the outcomes of
their research. It is our opinion that if original data is
produced with public funding and voluntary contribu-
tions of study participants, the common interest (in a
civic repertoire, Sharon, 2018) has to be addressed to
avoid monopolization of this data.
Last but not least: a data use agreement should
always include a right for the original controller to
audit the implementation of the obligations speciﬁed
in the agreement. Non-compliance with these obliga-
tions should lead to revocation of the agreement to
use the data. The data use agreement is therefore the
sole instrument by which data governance can be exer-
cised over the entire data life cycle.
Data security and privacy controls:
Scientific research vs. health care
The fourth pillar to build upon is data security and
privacy controls. One of the major pitfalls to deal
with is that when conducting scientiﬁc medical
research, one has to be aware that this is a fundamen-
tally diﬀerent context from the regular health care
context that most people involved are familiar with.
The same staﬀ involved in regular health care-related
patient assessments, lab-analysis or equipment oper-
ation are often also involved in the collection and pro-
cessing of scientiﬁc research data. Whereas the regular
health care processes require repeated identiﬁcation of
a patient, in order to avoid mix-up of people or treat-
ments, the scientiﬁc process requires deep pseudonymi-
sation of all information ﬂows in order to avoid
unnecessary identiﬁcation of participants. This funda-
mental diﬀerence in context – while working with the
same staﬀ and analysis processes – is a permanent
source of misunderstanding or incorrect handling of
data. We have seen that training people to be aware
of this diﬀerence and acting accordingly requires a
lot of eﬀort. A second pitfall is that data needs high
levels of protection (information security) and inherent
privacy guarantees to prevent leakage or unlawful
combination of data. Given the long life span of the
scientiﬁc data, risks are considerable. There are
many known cases of large scale data leakage in
recent years (AP, 2017; Joseph, 2017). New technology
is required to protect data over their entire lifecycle
using principles of security and privacy by design.
In order to facilitate this we – as computer science
experts – have worked with the Personalized
Parkinson’s Project to devise new ways of data cre-
ation, storage and sharing. We have developed a
technology called Polymorphic Encryption and
Pseudonymisation (Verheul et al., 2016). This technol-
ogy enables strong encryption of all research data in or
near to the data source, remaining in an encrypted state
during transport and storage of data in the research
data repository. No data-management staﬀ, hosting
partner or cloud-service provider has the ability to
access and decrypt the data. Only legitimate users
(approved by the Research and Data Sharing Review
Board) receive speciﬁc cryptographic keys for those
parts of the data they are entitled to. They will be
able to download this data in encrypted form from
the repository and decrypt them in a secured working
environment where data can be analysed. Encryption
keys are managed in a distributed way, which means
that legitimate users receive parts of their key from dif-
ferent actors, and only in combining the parts a correct
key is constructed. Added to that, data is pseudony-
mised in such a way that every user (actually every
project team) receives a unique pseudonym for a
study participant. This means that pseudonyms
cannot be exchanged between researchers working in
diﬀerent projects. Using this technique data is protected
from leakage, hacking or theft while in movement or
while stored in the study repository. Pseudonymisation
is strong and distributed, making exchange of data and
re-identiﬁcation unlikely.
Far from utopia
All measures and precautions discussed here – tech-
nical, organizational and legal – contribute to the pro-
tection of the privacy of study participants. None of
these measures are fail-safe however. They need to be
aligned and reinforce each other. Especially human
error or misconduct can lead to serious privacy risks.
As an example, a data use agreement may prohibit de-
pseudonymisation of data or linking of data to other
sources. However, once a legitimate user has received
and decrypted data from the repository, this data can
be leaked. And data is often self-identifying, especially
if combined with other sources (Elliot et al., 2018). A
total genome sequence for instance is unique and can
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therefore be used in forensic contexts to identify people
with a very high degree of certainty. Also, common
daily practice acting as a medical professional is very
diﬀerent from handling data as a researcher, especially
when multiple roles are exercised by the same staﬀ.
Another example of this is that participants themselves
should be asked to restrain themselves in the use of
social media concerning their participation in the
research project as such exposure undermines any pseu-
donymisation eﬀort (Elliot et al., 2018). The awareness
of such context-speciﬁc responsibilities and good prac-
tices is of great importance for the long-term protection
of the data and the privacy of the study participants.
Conclusion
Responsible management of medical data for research
purposes requires a multidisciplinary professional
approach. Based on the practical experience from a
project like the Personalized Parkinson’s Project,
good practices and new technological approaches can
be combined and ﬁeld tested. Consent, governance,
legal data use agreements and data protection require
specialized professionals in areas of communication,
medical, legal, organizational and technical ﬁelds who
should be aware of the complexities of the entire pro-
cess of creating and sharing scientiﬁc data. Only an
integrated multidisciplinary approach can oﬀer suﬃ-
cient guarantees for the protection of personal data
and the privacy of study participants, although it is
impossible to reduce the risks involved to zero.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conﬂicts of interest with
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following ﬁnancial sup-
port for the research, authorship, and/ or publication of this
article: This work was funded by the Province of Gelderland
grant 2016-006615.
Notes
1. See: https://pep.cs.ru.nl for details.
2. See: http://www.parkinsonopmaat.nl
3. Following the GDPR (http://data.consilium.europa.eu/
doc/document/ST-5419-2016-INIT/en/pdf)
4. That is, ISO27001 and ISO27002 for information security
and ISO25237 for pseudonymisation.
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